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I. ATTORNEY'S FEES
During the last two years, attorney fees issues have arisen in both the
public arena and the probate courts. One could see the dramatic change in
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attitude of the courts in the significant case of Florida Patient's Compensa-
tion Fund v. Rowe' followed with more explication by Standard Guaranty
Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom.2  The majority opinions in both cases
determined that a reasonable fee for any lawyer, for nearly any service, is
the reasonable number of hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,
called a lodestar method.3 Further, both Rowe and Standard Guaranty
make it clear that testimony regarding fees must be taken and must cover
specific areas, such as reasonable hourly rates and reasonable number of
hours.4 A bald affidavit that may have sufficed in the past is no longer
enough.5
In Rowe, the factual situation centered on payments of attorney fees to
attorneys representing claimants against the state-established Compensation
Fund, which came from public funds.6 In Standard Guaranty, the case
dealt with reasonable attorney fees when set by a court using a lodestar
method.7 It is in the decision of Standard Guaranty that the Florida
Supreme Court set the stage to review fee arrangements in probate matters
when it referred to situations wherein there was already an assurance of
collecting fees,8 and the attorneys involved would not be taking a risk of
nonpayment. It was this lack of risk that separated probate and other
similarly situated cases from the litigation risk that justified not only a
reasonable hourly rate times a reasonable number of hours, but also a
multiplier.
The Florida Probate Code outlines the criteria to be used in determining
reasonable attorney fees.9 It is strikingly similar to the guidelines set forth
in the lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct.' ° The statute is geared to
the payment of attorney fees due the attorney for being the personal
representative of the estate. It covers neither individual beneficiaries nor
creditors paying their attorneys nor how that would be determined since the
funds would not ordinarily be payable from the estate." Further, the
I. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
2. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
3. Standard Guaranty, 555 So. 2d at 835; Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.
4. Standard Guaranty, 555 So. 2d at 834; Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150.
5. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150.
6. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1145.
7. Standard Guaranty, 555 So. 2d at 829.
8. Id. at 835.
9. See generally ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500.
10. See FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.5(b) (1991).
I1. See ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991)).
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statute did not specify the importance to be placed on each of the criteria in
its earlier versions. Traditionally, in the probate area, attorneys for the
personal representative of an estate were paid on the basis of a percentage
of the value of the estate. This may have made up for work done over the
years for the family for which no charge would have been made.
A. The Platt Case
Then came the NCNB Trust Department, which took the position that
taking three percent of a seven million dollar estate, for which they already
served as guardian of the property and marshalled the assets, was eminently
reasonable. In In re Estate of Platt,"2 the Florida Supreme Court revised
the way atlorney fee disputes may be resolved in probate cases. There are
actually two Platt decisions: one issued in April, 1991 ("Platt /,)"3 and
the other issued in October, 1991 ("Platt I]").4 The second was only a
revision of the first.
At the time of Lester Platt's death, the residuary beneficiaries of Mr.
Platt's estate declined to sign a contract sent to them by NCNB in which the
bank stated that they intended to take a three percent fee. A proposed fee
letter was also sent to the beneficiaries by the attorney for the estate, George
Patterson, who also served as co-personal representative of the estate.
Instead, the residual beneficiaries, who would bear the burden of the fees,
requested both the bank and the attorney to maintain time records. The
attorney complied with the request while the bank did not even attempt to
do so. 5 As disclosed in the appellate court opinion, there was a major
evidentiary hearing involving several recognized expert witnesses. They
testified as to reasonableness of the hourly rate for the attorney, his/her
reputation, the custom in the community for charging, and presumably the
other criteria to be used in properly determining attorney fees in a disputed
probate case.' 6
The Florida Supreme Court in Platt held the following: (1) in a
dispute, attorney fees for the attorney for the personal representative shall
be determined by multiplying a reasonable number of hours by a reasonable
12. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991) (quashing and superseding the supreme court's first
opinion of In re Estate of Platt, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Fla. Apr. 4, 1991)).
13. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Fla. Apr. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Platt I].
14. In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d at 328 [hereinafter Platt I1].
15. Id. at 330.
16. Id. at 329-30.
19931
3
Donahue: Probate and Trust Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
hourly rate and may not be determined by a percentage of the estate
assets;' 7 (2) the time and effort it takes for an attorney to recover his/her
fees is not to be paid from the estate; 8 and (3) unless agreed to by the
customer, time and effort are to be the only considerations in determining
the proper fees to be paid a corporate fiduciary serving as personal
representative' 9 and such fees are not to be based on a percentage.2" The
Supreme Court of Florida reversed the decision of the circuit court in
awarding fees to the attorney and the bank based on a percentage of the
estate, and directed the circuit court to take evidence and make a new
determination of proper fees in light of their new means of awarding
fees.2
Subsequent to Platt II and its progeny, several cases have been decided
that explicate Platt II or parts thereof. For example, in Carman v. Gil-
bert,22 the Second District'Court of Appeal sent the issue of attorney fees
back to the circuit court for further proceedings in a will contest, stating that
the lodestar principles in Rowe had not been followed.23
B. New Statutes for Attorney and Personal Representative Fees
In a decided effort to replace the holding of Platt II as the law that
applies to probate cases in Florida, the Florida Legislature passed House Bill
1295 in the 1993 Legislature.24 Many parts of this particular legislation
are covered elsewhere, but the portions relating to attorney fees and personal
representative fees will be addressed here. 5 Section 733.617 of the Florida
Statutes, governing compensation of personal representatives, has been
amended,2 6 and section 733.6171, a new section governing the compensa-
tion of attorneys for personal representatives, has been added27 to the
Florida Probate Code. A provision is also explicitly made for payment of
17. Id.
18. Id. at 336.
19. Platt II, 586 So. 2d at 337.
20. Id. at 336.
21. Id. at 337.
22. 615 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
23. Id. at 704-05.
24. See Fla. HB 1295 (1993).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 204-216.
26. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991)).
27. Id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2503 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171).
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fees from the assets of a revocable trust,28 even though such assets have
not heretofore been considered subject to probate administration after In re
Estate of Katz.
29
Further, the Florida Legislature has returned to the past by statutorily
setting fees for the compensation of personal representatives in case of a
dispute."0 Such fees, called commissions, are to be based on a percentage
of the value of the estate subject to probate administration.31 It is a
graduated scale with three percent due for estates valued up to one million
dollars, two and one-half percent due for estates valued between one million
and five million dollars, two percent for estates valued between five million
and ten million dollars, and one-and one-half percent for estates valued over
ten million dollars. Additional fees are allowable in a dispute for certain
extra efforts that may be involved, such as running the decedent's business,
sale of real or personal property, or litigation involved in the estate.
Two particular reasons for additional compensation may spawn
litigation and definitely raise questions that are not resolved by the plain
meaning of the statute. Section 733.617(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes allows
extra commission for "[i]nvolvement in proceedings for the adjustment or
payment of any taxes. 32 In nearly every estate there will be a final federal
income tax return (Form 1040) due and, in some estates, there will be more
than one clue.33 In many estates, where income is generated, an estate
income tax return (Form 1041) is required.34 Occasionally, when real
estate tax assessments are determined during the course of administering an
estate, the personal representative is involved in determining the most
beneficial assessment to the estate and in adjusting the amount of tax due. 35
Considering the language in this statute, the question arises as to whether the
mere filing of a return constitutes an "involvement in proceedings" that
would justify payment of commissions in addition to the percentage.
28. See id.
29. 528 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
30. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(199 1)); see also Plait I 586 So. 2d at 334-36 (dismissing basis for determining fees on a
percentage).
31. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991)).
32. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.617(3)(c)).
33. See BASIC PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 4.26 (1987).
34. Id. (Obligation to File Tax Returns and Notices For Decedent and Estate).
35. Id.
1993]
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Nevertheless, despite all of the particular reasons the Florida Legisla-
ture has enunciated in section 733.617(3), the statute gives no basis for
determining how much in additional fees should be paid. Is there an extra
percentage, or would a court need to follow the directives of Platt II,
Standard Guaranty, and Rowe? Is not the genuine involvement in revising
a value for real estate within the estate context a better example of what
would justify additional commissions?
In some estates where the gross value of all the assets exceeds
$600,000, a federal estate tax return is due nine months after the decedent's
date of death. The return is extensive, usually requiring a great deal of
explicit and accurate details, answers to numerous questions regarding many
tax and estate decisions that affect the estate, the taxes paid, and the
beneficiaries' interests. Frequently, voluminous attachments are required
with this return, which already contains thirty-three pages itself.36 While
it is an absolute requirement in larger estates, the question remains as to
whether this also would be considered "involvement in proceedings for the
adjustment or payment of any taxes." Frequently, there are situations in
which a surviving spouse receives enough of the assets such that the
combination of the marital deduction (no tax) and the unified credit amount
($600,000) result in no tax actually due, even though a Form 706 return is
certainly due.
The other subsection, to be codified at section 733.617(3)(e), appears
to be designed to allow courts to allow extra fees for situations not covered
by the statute but which clearly exceed the customary efforts required of a
personal representative.3 7 The personal representative's regular duties-
marshalling the assets, protecting and securing the decedent's assets,
determining and notifying creditors of their right to make claims against the
estate, paying proper claims timely, distributing assets to the beneficiaries,
filing any required tax returns, preparing an accounting, and closing the
estate-all must be handled efficiently and expeditiously. 8  However,
many questions like the following still remain: Do "special services" cover
taking care of a decedent's cat or dog? If included in the standard fee, what
period of care is covered? Do "special services" cover cleaning a decedent's
home or packing pictures for delivery to numerous beneficiaries? Do they
cover collecting rents on several out of state properties that are not subject
36. Id.
37. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.617(3)(e)).
38. BASIC PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 4.9; FLA. STAT. § 733.602(I)
(1991).
[Vol. 18
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/9
Donohue
to probate? Do they involve the time and effort involved in exhuming a
body that was buried before the decedent's wishes were known in the will?
Either the courts or the Legislature will be defining "special services" for
US.
The Legislature recognized that some estates more than others can
support more than one personal representative. 39  The new legislation
outlines the allocations to be made when there is more than one personal
representative and if the estate is valued at less than $100,000. In particular,
unless the estate is valued at less than $100,000, two personal representa-
tives may each take a full commission. However, if the estate is valued at
more than $100,000 and there are more than two personal representatives,
then all of the personal representatives share in the fees to which two
representatives would be entitled. In this situation, the personal representa-
tive holding the property or assets of the decedent and having primary
responsibility for their administration is entitled to receive a full commis-
sion. The remaining personal representatives are entitled to a proportionate
share of the second commission. For estates valued at less than $100,000
with multiple personal representatives, the one full commission normally
allowed to a sole personal representative must be apportioned among the
several personal representatives in proportion to their efforts.4"
What is not covered in House Bill 1295 is the compensation, if any, to
be paid to the trustee of a revocable living trust, and the compensation, if
any, to a personal representative for responsibility of transferring assets not
technically within the probate estate. It is not clear why there is a
distinction between compensation as a personal representative4 and for
attorney fees paid on the same estate.42
Additionally, according to current case and statutory law, an attorney
may be compensated twice.43 First, he/she may be compensated for his/her
work as a personal representative. 44 Second, he/she may also be compen-
sated for any legal services he/she may provide as the attorney for another
39. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2508 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.617(5)).
40. Id.
41. Id. 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991)).
42. See id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2503 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(2)).
43. See Plat I1, 586 So. 2d at 331-32.
44. Id.
19931
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personal representative.4" This view was acknowledged as the law of
Florida in Platt.6
The particular provisions of House Bill 1295 concerning the effective
date of the statutes pertaining to attorney fees are unusual. The new statute,
instead of applying to situations based on a decedent's date of death, as is
common in changes in probate law, "appl[ies] to estates in which an order
of discharge has not been entered prior to its effective date [October 1,
1993] .. .
The other major fee section of the new legislation is the new statute,
to be numbered in the engrossed legislation as Florida Statutes, section 733.-
6171,48 which explicitly outlines the compensation to be paid to an
attorney for the personal representative which ispresumedto be reasonable.
The compensation package uses a combination of a percentage of the value
of the estate with an hourly rate. It was encouraged in part by probate
attorney Rohan Kelley and reflects the fact that there were fairness problems
with both the full percentage and with the reasonable hourly rate multiplied
by reasonable number of hours.4 9 Attomeys are still undeniably permitted
and encouraged to enter into contracts with clients for payment of fees.5
Contracts signed by both the personal representative and any residuary
beneficiaries are the strongest since both have something to say about
attorney fees." The new statute sets forth a schedule for payment of fees
from the estate to the attorney and no separate order is required. 2
When there is a dispute about fees, the trial courts in resolving such disputes
are directed to use as their criteria two percent of the estate inventory value
and income earned during administration plus one percent of the balance of
the gross estate when a federal estate tax return is due. This percentage
appears to explicitly recognize that there is additional work on someone's
part when a federal estate tax return is due. 3 In addition to the percent-
age, an attorney is allowed a reasonable hourly rate both for the attomey
45. Id.
46. Id. at 328.
47. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2505 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.6171(8)).
48. Id. § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171).
49. Platt 11, 586 So. 2d at 333.
50. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2505 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 733.6171(6)).
51. Id. at 2503 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(2)).
52. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)).
53. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)(a)).
[Vol. 18
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and for others working for the attorney with special education, training, or
experience." The language was certainly intended to cover paralegals but
it covers more, such as investment advisors hired by an attorney.
While this two-part formula is certainly intended to be a guideline, the
court may increase or decrease the sum paid and has specific additional
criteria to use in increasing or decreasing such fees." These additional
criteria, unlike the previous statute discussed in Platt I, appear to be
specifically' designed for the probate arena and not for civil litigation.
Section 733.6171(4)(h) of the Florida Statutes provides one of the most
interesting criteria: "any delay in payment of the compensation after the
services were furnished. 56 The message here is that slow-paying estates
may not make their lawyers their bankers.
In another departure from the holding of Platt II, the Florida Legisla-
ture in section 733.6171(7) of the Florida Statutes explicitly allows that the
litigation over attorney fees involving the personal representative's attorney
does not mean the attorney must lose money in trying to collect his/her
fee.5 7 Instead, trial court proceedings to determine compensation are part
of the estate administration process and the court decides from what part of
the estate such litigation costs should be paid 8 This appears to be a fairer
solution to the growth in litigation over fees; attorneys do not automatically
lose money if there is a contest about fees, and clients are not encouraged
to litigate fee issues to reduce fees which have been agreed to previously.
Some questions are raised by the language of the new statute. The
word "inventory" is not defined in the definition section of the Florida
Probate Code, section 731.201, as a probate inventory. The word "invento-
ry" must be defined in order to determine the "balance" noted in section
733.6171(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes.59 Some skeptics may argue that the
provision that allows the attorney to receive a percentage of the income
during the estate administration encourages prolonging of the estate process.
Furthermore, the provision on contracts between attorneys and decedents in
section 733.6171(6) leaves the issue unresolved whether such contracts are
54. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)(b)).
55. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2504 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 733.6171(4)).
56. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(4)(h)).
57. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(7)).
58. See id.
59. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)(a)).
19931
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binding on estates when the residual beneficiaries, those who bear the
burden of the fees, are not parties.6"
Again, the effective date of this section is October 1, 1993, and applies
not to estates for decedents who have died as of that date, but to probates
still open or in which attorney fees have not been determined.6'
C. Other Attorney Fees Issues
The cases on attorney fees most often center around the fees to be paid
to the attorney acting for the estate and, in particular, the personal represen-
tative thereof. However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Dourado v.
Chousa6 2 dealt with the obligation of the personal representative and
beneficiary to make up the difference in attorney fees due if there is a
deficiency.
II. HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPT PROPERTY
The concept of homestead under Florida law continues to be an enigma
to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. While most lay persons think of
homestead only as a $25,000 exemption from real estate taxes, Florida
courts continue to wrestle with the concept of homestead as it relates both
to the descent and distribution of property and to creditors' claims on
decedents' property. Even though the change to the Florida Constitution
was effective in 1984, recent years have also yielded a plethora of litigation
spawned by homestead issues.
Two recent cases involve the descent of homestead property where the
surviving spouse had validly waived his homestead rights. In Sun First
National Bank Polk County v. Fry,63 the decedent was survived by a
spouse and six adult lineal descendants. The decedent's will had devised the
homestead property to a testamentary trust rather than to the spouse or lineal
descendants. Although the lineal descendants contended that the Florida
Constitution and Florida Statutes as to homestead were violated by the
decedent's improper devise, the court held that since the surviving spouse
60. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2505 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 733.6171 (6)).
61. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8)).
62. 604 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
63. 579 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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had waived homestead and there were no minor children, the property could
be freely devised even if there were adult children.64
Shortly thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court, in Hartwell v. Blasinga-
me,65 came to the same conclusion where an adult child sought to be the
heir to property that the decedent had devised to her former husband, the
surviving spouse having previously waived his homestead rights in a
prenuptial agreement. The court held the spouse's waiver to be binding;66
the spouse was deemed to have predeceased the decedent. Since there was
no minor child, there was no constitutional restriction on the devise of the
property by the decedent. The court cited its previous decision in City
National Bank v. Tescher67 as corroborating authority.68
Even though a surviving spouse is entitled to at least a life estate in
homestead property, in Breausche v. Prough69 the surviving wife received
more. The surviving wife claimed that she was misled by her husband into
believing that their home was jointly owned and that she would receive the
entire interest upon his death. She claimed that in reliance thereon she had
contributed funds to the construction of the home and payments on the
mortgage and had relinquished certain rights she had in other real estate.
The court ruled that the surviving spouse could seek to impose a construc-
tive trust on the homestead if she could produce admissible evidence in the
trial court to prove her claim."° Such evidence could include an affidavit
by a disinterested party as to direct knowledge of the decedent's prior
statements to his wife, which could overcome evidence otherwise barred by
the Dead Man's Statute.7
Creditors continue to attempt to assert claims and to force the sale of
homestead property that passed from the debtor-decedent to devisees. Two
cases involved whether the Florida constitutional protection from forced sale
of homestead property inured to the benefit of devisees who were heirs of
the decedent. In a decision favoring the rights of heirs, a district court in
Bartelt v. Bartel7 2 held that the protected "class designated 'heirs' does not
exclude those who, but for the decedent's foresight in executing a will,
64. Id. at 870.
65. 584 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1991).
66. Id.
67. 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991).
68. Hartwell, 584 So. 2d at 6.
69. 592 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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would have taken by the laws of intestate succession. 73 While article X,
section 4 of the Florida Constitution designates the exempt class of persons
as the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner, "it does not mandate the
technique by which the qualified person must receive title., 74  To hold
otherwise, said the court, would discourage the making of wills and
encourage the passing of property by the less desirable process of intestacy.
To the same effect was the holding in HCA Gulf Coast Hospital v.
Downing.7 5 There the court determined the heir possessed an equitable or
beneficial interest in real property through a spendthrift trust established by
the decedent. The court stated that the heir could assert the homestead
exemption from forced sale as though the property had passed directly from
the decedent to the heir by devise or by intestacy.76 The homestead
exemption, said the court, is to be construed liberally to accomplish its
design to secure a homeowner protection from creditors and financial
misfortune, and a court should go beyond mere technicalities in effectuating
the intent of a decedent as expressed in a will or trust.77 The court
cautioned, however, that in this case it might have decided otherwise if the
trustee had exercised more than a supervisory interest in the homestead as
the holder of legal title.78
On the other hand, an heir to homestead property is not protected
against certain creditors of the decedent. Where the decedent's friend had
lived with the decedent and claimed that she had provided funds used to
purchase and improve the homestead property, she fit into the exception
under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. In Burns v. Cobb,"
the court held that her claim for equitable ownership in the property, if
valid, would defeat the claims of the decedent's heirs who took with notice
of her possession of the property and her claim thereto. Furthermore, the
court declared that she would have a defense to the heirs' ejectment action
(even if they had a future possessory interest) "if that equitable ownership
interest is established as a legal title interest and includes a present
possessory right."'" While upholding her right to pursue a counterclaim
73. Id. at 284.
74. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
75. 594 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
76. Id. at 776.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 589 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 416.
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to the heirs' ejectment action, however, the court held that she could not
challenge this action in the probate court.8 2 The friend petitioned to reopen
the estate and contest the heirs' action in petitioning the probate court for
determination of homestead and closing the estate. Since the petition to
determine homestead did not constitute the opening and closing of a probate
estate administration and she did not seek as a creditor or other interested
person to open the administration of the estate, she could not move forward
in that arena. 3
Where homestead property passes to minor children, it is not subject
to claims of creditors because it is protected by article X, section 4 of the
Florida Constitution. In In re Estate of Tudhope,14 the real property
involved was encumbered by a mortgage, payments on which the children
were unable to meet. 5 As a consequence, the personal representative of
the decedent's estate was authorized to sell the property by court order.
Claims were filed by decedent's creditors in the probate proceeding (other
than the mortgagee), and the issue was whether the sale proceeds could be
reached by those creditors.86 The court held that since the property was
devised to heirs and the will did not direct that the property be sold, the
homestead estate was vested in the minor children prior to its sale. 7
Therefore, the proceeds were still characterized as homestead and thus not
subject to creditors. The court distinguished In re Estate of Price,"8 in
which the will had directed that the homestead be sold and the proceeds
divided among the adult children, thus causing the proceeds to lose their
homestead character and be subject to creditors' claims.8 9
Finally, in a recent case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced
with an issue of first impression on the homestead exemption. In Hubert v.
Hubert,9" the court was called upon to decide whether an heir's remainder
interest in his deceased father's homestead was exempt from the decedent's
estate creditors, where the property was subject to the life estate of a non-
heir.9 The court relied on both the Florida Constitution and Bartelt to
declare that the homestead exemption inures to the interest of the son-heir
82. Id.
83. Id. at 415.
84. 595 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 313.
87. Id.
88. 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
89. Tudhope, 595 So. 2d at 313.
90. 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
91. Id. al: 1049.
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acquired either by devise or by intestate succession.92 Even though the son
had no current possessory interest in the property and the decedent's
homestead exemption would not inure to the non-heir's life estate, it did
inure to the heir's remainder interest. The court was impressed with the
heir's arguments that since the vested remainder interest of a lineal
descendant is protected by the homestead exemption in situations where the
lineal descendant's vested remainder comes from an intestate estate of a
decedent who leaves a surviving spouse and a lineal descendant,93 or where
the decedent devised a life estate in his homestead to his wife with a
remainder to a lineal descendant, it should be protected in this case. The
court cited with favor the HCA Gulf Coast Hospital statement that the
homestead provision is to be construed liberally to effect its purpose, and
stated that the resolution in the instant case "is consistent with carrying out
the interest of the testator and the public policy of our homestead exemp-
tion. '"" The court distinguished the cases which held that an heir's future
interest was not exempt from the heir's creditors, since in those situations
the heir was not in possession and thus could not claim that the future
interest was exempt as the heir's homestead.95
The court was also called upon to define the term "automobile" under
section 732.402(2)(b), the exempt property statute. If automobiles are "held
in the decedent's name and regularly used by decedent or members of the
decedent's immediate family as their personal automobiles," they pass to the
surviving spouse and are exempt from all claims against the estate (except
for perfected security interests).96  In re Estate of Corbin97  involved a
motor home and a travel trailer. In Corbin, the court looked to the
"regularly used" portion of the statute rather than focusing on what is an
automobile. The court imposed this as a requirement and finding such
evidence lacking, decided against the spouse.98 The full definition of an
automobile, therefore, remains in doubt and may not always be necessary
to resolve cases.
92. Id. at 1050 (citing the FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4(b); Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
93. FLA. STAT. § 732.401(l) (1991). Both the spouse's life estate and the vested
remainder would be protected as homestead. The same result would follow from a devise
in that form.
94. Hubert, 622 So. 2d at 1050 (citing HCA GuifCoast Hosp., 594 So. 2d at 774).
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 733.402 (2)(b) (1991).
97. 603 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
98. Id. at 129.
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III. CLAIMS
Claims against estates which have substantially shorter time frames than
civil litigation still warrant appellate attention. Additionally, the Supreme
Court case of Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope99 and
local statutes following Pope create more opportunities for appellate cases.
Section 733.702 of the Florida Statutes provides that the following are
not binding on the estate, the personal representative, or on any beneficiary
unless such a claim is filed within three months after the time of the first
publication of the Notice of Administration: a claim or demand against a
decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent; a claim for
funeral or burial expenses; a claim for personal property in the possession
of the personal representative; a claim for damages, including, but not
limited to, an action founded on fraud or another wrongful act or omission
of the decedent. As to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the
Notice of Administration, the above stated claims are not binding unless the
claim is filed thirty days after the date of service of such a copy of the
notice on the creditor.' ° This is the statute adopted by the Florida
Legislature in response to the Pope case.
Spohr v. Berryman... held that Florida Statutes section 733.702 is a
statute of limitation, even though it is known as a statute of non-claim.
0 2
The requirement in section 733.702 that a claim be filed within three months
was not satisfied by filing a lawsuit within the non-claim period.' Thus,
probate procedures must be followed.
Section 733.702(3) of the Florida Statutes permits a circuit court to
extend the time period during which a claim may be filed.' 4 Thus, cases
frequently arise when the time within which to file a claim is enlarged. In
In re Estate of Myerson,' °5 the court, in a per curiam decision, held that
it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to extend the time for
filing a probate claim.0 6 However, the trial court did err "in enjoining the
disposition of any estate assets, without conducting a hearing on a request
for temporary injunction and requiring the appellee to prove up her
99. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
100. FLA. STAT. § 733.701(1) (1991).
101. 589 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991).
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id. at 227-28.
104. FLA. STAT. § 733.702(3) (1991).
105. 596 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
106. Id. at 533.
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entitlement to injunctive relief."' °7
Sireci v. Deal' dealt with extending the time to file an independent
action after objection to the claim is filed.' 09 On September 4, 1989,
Roger McClelland, an attorney, filed a Petition for Appointment for a
Curator in the Estate of Donald M. Sparks. On September 15, 1989, Deal
filed a caveat by creditor in the estate, which was treated as a claim against
the estate. McClelland became curator and filed a Notice of Administration
and an Objection to Deal's claim and notified Deal. Eventually, a formal
estate was filed October 16, 1990, and Thomas J. Sireci, Jr. was appointed
personal representative on November 30, 1990. On May 2, 1991, the
personal representative filed a petition to bar Deal's claim. On August 26,
1991, the personal representative received an objection to the petition to bar
the claim. The probate court denied the personal representative's petition
to bar the claim and gave Deal ten days to amend his claim; however, the
personal representative appealed from this order."0
The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling. In doing so, the
court reasoned that the probate judge has broad discretion in determining
when good cause exists to grant an extension for filing an independent
action."' The court further stated that it could only override the probate
court's discretion if there is no factual basis for the probate court's
conclusion." 12 In this case, there was such a factual basis. During the
trial court hearing, Deal's attorney presented several reasons why the
independent action had not been filed." 3 For example, Deal's long-time
attorney from Pennsylvania testified that he believed the personal represen-
tative was representing Deal as a creditor and that the personal representa-
tive would therefore advise him of any formalities to make the claim
valid." '4 Furthermore, the Pennsylvania attorney testified he thought the
petition to bar the claim was intended to place the matter in abeyance until
a settlement could be reached among all the heirs." 5
Section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires a personal
representative to promptly make a diligent search to determine the names
107. Id. at 533-34.
108. 603 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1993).
109. Id. at 35-36.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 36.
112. Id.
113. Serici, 603 So. 2d at 36.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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and addresses of creditors of the decedent who are reasonably ascertainable
and to serve on those creditors a copy of the Notice of Administration
within three months after the first publication of the Notice." 6 Personal
representatives usually need to review previously filed tax returns and
checkbook registers.
The determination of ascertainable creditors has been the subject of
several suits. Jones v. SunBank of Miami 17 concerned the sale of a gas
station approximately four years prior to a decedent's death. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's decision. At trial, the claimant contended she
should have received a Notice of Administration because she was a known
or reasonably ascertainable creditor."' The decedent had died August 15,
1989. Notice of Administration was published August 29, 1989 and the
claims period expired November 29, 1989. The claimant, the gas station
purchaser, filed suit against the decedent's estate March 15, 1990, seeking
damages for breach of contract and fraud for alleged environmental
contamination to the premises. The trial court determined the claim was
filed untimely and, as a result, the burden shifted to the claimant to seek an
order enlarging time to file the claim." 9 After a full evidentiary hearing,
the trial court ruled that the claimant was not a known or reasonably
ascertainable creditor who was entitled to receive a Notice of Administra-
tion. 12' The appellate court noted that the trial court should have stricken
the claim as untimely when there was no motion for enlargement of time to
file.'12
In this instance, the trial court also rejected the claimant's argument
that gas stations often cause environmental damage, which, as a result, gives
rise to a need to give actual notice to the purchaser upon decedent/seller's
death. 122 Finally, the trial court concluded that it:
does not interpret [Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v.] Pope
to require that a personal representative determine the identities of
persons or entities with whom a decedent had business dealings or other
transactions during a given number of years prior to death and to serve
a Notice of Administration upon each one merely because such person
might possibly have some uncommunicated dissatisfaction with a matter.
116. FLA. STAT. § 733.212(4)(a) (1991).
117. 609 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 101.
119. Id. at 100-01.
120. Id. at 101.
121. Id. at 102.
122. Jones, 609 So. 2d at 101.
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As to those persons, notice by publication is sufficient to afford due
process. "23
To the relief of many practitioners, there is a limit to the efforts that need
to be made.
In Burgis v. Burgis, 2 4 Lynn Burgis, the former wife of the decedent,
filed a petition to require payment of her claim for past due alimony. The
personal representative, who was the decedent's second wife, was alleged
to have knowledge of Lynn's status as a creditor and of her claim for
unpaid alimony.'25 The Second District Court of Appeal held that due
process required actual notice pursuant to Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, and noted that Lynn's petition appeared to specifical-
ly meet the criteria of Florida Probate Rule 5.495, which was in effect at the
time the'Petition was filed.' 26
The appellate court reversed the trial court's order which denied the
petition because Lynn had previously filed an independent action which had
been dismissed.' The court noted that the issue to be determined was
merely whether Lynn should be able to explain her status and the reason she
untimely filed her claim. 28 It did not rule upon the validity of Lynn's
claim, which was not before the court.
29
Further, the court also noted that Florida Probate Rule 5.495 was
deleted effective October 1, 1991 because of the enactment of section
733.702 of the Florida Statutes. 3 ° As amended, the statute provides for
an extension of time in which a claim may be filed upon grounds of fraud,
estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period.' 3'
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF WILLS
Florida's laws on the signing of wills have been on the books for many
years. Certainly it is a far more settled area of the law than the law of
123. Id. at 102-03.
124. 611 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
125. Id. at 595.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 596.
128. Id.
129. Burgis, 611 So. 2d at 596.
130. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1991).
131. FLA. STAT § 733.702 (1991).
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trusts; however, the procedural aspects of execution and proving of wills
continue to engender controversy.
In Simpson v. Williamson,' 32 the testator had signed the self-proving
affidavit but nowhere else on the will did his signature appear. In addition,
a witness submitted an affidavit that one of the two witnesses to the will had
not signed in the presence of both the testator and the other witness. The
attorney who drafted the will, on the other hand, filed an affidavit that the
testator, both witnesses, and he as the notary, all signed in the presence of
each other.'33  The court, in holding that the lower court improperly
granted summary judgment, stated that the testator had validly executed the
will. "'34 The court also stated that the attorney's signature on the self-
proving affidavit could be used as another witness to validate the will since
the determining factor is not where the witness's signature appears but,
rather, whether the signature was affixed under circumstances to indicate the
person is an attesting and subscribing witness.'35 In the end, the court
favored saving the will.'36
What if a validly executed will is lost and an unsigned carbon copy is
introduced into probate? Florida rules seem to indicate that it is not an
uncontested event to have the copy of the will admitted; rather, it is
automatically adversarial. In Kero v. Di Legge,' 37 the copy of the will
was not signed by the decedent and only one of the two subscribing
witnesses was available to testify as to the authenticity and execution of the
will. The court held that this was a "correct" copy within the meaning of
section 733.207(3) of the Florida Statutes, which requires the testimony of
only one witness to prove "due execution.',3' The court reasoned that the
necessary signatures are not required because the purpose of a correct copy
is not to prove execution but rather the contents of the original will.'39
Two recently decided cases involve a testator's attempt to revoke a will
or a codicil. In In re Estate of Dickson,'40 the court was called upon to
decide whether the decedent's intention to revoke was accompanied by the
requisite physical act of revocation. The decedent had written on the self-
132. 611 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
133. Id. at 545.
134. Id. at 547.
135. Id. at 546.
136. Id.
137. 591 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
138. Id. at 677.
139. Id.
140. 590 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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proof affidavit, which was the final page of the will: "March 16, 1987 I
MYSELF DECLARE THIS WILL NULL AND VOID OF SOUND MIND"
followed by his signature, and had written and circled the word "void" over
the raised notarial seal. 14 1 In finding this a sufficient physical act, the
court stated that Florida Statutes section 732.506 did not require any specific
degree of physical destruction, obliteration, or cancellation to accompany
clear evidence of intent. 42  The court also found that the self-proof
affidavit had been incorporated into the will; thus, the physical act
constituted a revocation of the entire will.
143
In re Estate of Tolin144 involved the following question, which was
certified to the Florida Supreme Court asone of great importance:
MAY A CODICIL TO A WILL BE REVOKED BY DESTROYING
A PHOTOGRAPHIC COPY IF THE TESTATOR BELIEVED THAT
BY SUCH ACT HE WAS DESTROYING THE ORIGINAL AND
THE TESTATOR INTENDED TO REVOKE THE CODICIL?
45
The court answered this question in the negative, stating that section
732.506 of the Florida Statutes requires that the document destroyed by a
physical act must be the original document. 46 However, because the
intent of the testator to revoke the codicil was undisputed, the court imposed
the equitable remedy of a constructive trust to prevent the unjust enrichment
of the codicil's devisee as a result of the testator's mistake. 4 7 The court
also noted the importance of distinguishing an original document from a
copy, and advised attorneys who prepare documents such as wills and
codicils to consider specifically designating which documents are copies,
since modern technology makes it difficult to distinguish them. 41 Un-
141. Id. at 472.
142. Id.
143. Id. No mention was made of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in this
case. Under that doctrine, if a testator cancels a will with the intention of making a new one
immediately and the new will is not made, it is presumed that the testator preferred the old
will to no will and consequent intestacy, and the old will may be admitted to probate.
Apparently, the testator in this case had not intended to make a new will immediately after
destroying the old one.
144. 622 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993).
145. Id. at 989.
146. Id. at 990.
147. Id. at 990-91.
148. Id.
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doubtedly this case has changed procedures for signing wills in many law
offices.
In their interpretation of ambiguous provisions in wills, Florida courts
attempt to ascertain the intent of the testator. This intent is gleaned from
the context of the will and from parol evidence of the draftsman. In In re
Estate of Walker, 49 the decedent's will left "all of my personal property"
(as well as all real property) to named beneficiaries, but also contained a
residuary clause devising the remaining property to a church. At issue was
whether the term "personal property" should be interpreted to mean only
tangible personal property; in this case, the intangible personal property
would pass to the residual beneficiary. "5 ' The court withdrew its prior
decision in favor of a new opinion which upheld the admission of oral
testimony by the will draftsman.' The draftsman testified that the
testator had intended to limit the nonresiduary devise to tangible personal
property, thereby giving effect to the residuary clause which would
otherwise have been insignificant.' The interpretation made a difference
to the Presbyterian Church, the residuary beneficiary and to the malpractice
carrier for the draftsman. The court rejected the contention that the
testimony of the draftsman, who was also the personal representative
violated the Dead Man's Statute,' since in this case the personal repre-
sentative, would not gain or lose from either interpretation of the will.' 54
Even in the absence of parol evidence, Florida courts will liberally
construe the wording in a will to carry out the testator's intent. In In re
Estate of Reese,' the trustees sought permission from the court to divide
the trust created under decedent's will into a generation-skipping-transfer-
exempt trust and a nonexempt trust with the same dispositive provisions as
the single trust. The decedent's will directed the trustees "to reduce to the
lowest possible amount the federal estate tax payable by reason of my death
and any federal generation-skipping tax on any transfer with respect to
which I am the deemed transferor ... .""' The court found the dece-
dent's expressed intent to be unequivocal and held that the trust could be so
149. 609 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 625.
152. Id.
153. FLA. STAT. § 90.602 (1991).
154. Walker, 609 So. 2d at 625-26.
155. 622 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
156. Id. at 158.
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divided as a matter of construction rather than by reformation of the
will. 57
V. TRUSTS
Although the law on various aspects of wills is well-settled and
explicitly stated in statutes, this is not the case with the other popular estate
planning tool-the revocable living trust. Probably the most surprising
decision involving living trusts in Florida was handed down by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1993 in the case of Zuckerman v. Alter.' The question
certified from the lower court was:
WHETHER PARAGRAPH 689.075(l)(g), FLORIDA STATUTES
(1989), CREATES A SINGLE TEST, OR TWO ALTERNATIVE
TESTS, FOR THE VALIDITY OF AN INTER VIVOS TRUST
EXECUTED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1969, WHERE THE SETTLOR
IS THE SOLE TRUSTEE?159
r'he statute provides that an otherwise valid trust is not invalidated or an
attempted testamentary disposition thwarted
because the settlor is, at the time of execution of the instrument, or
thereafter becomes, sole trustee; provided that at the time the trust
instrument is executed it is either valid under the laws of the jurisdic-
tion in which it is executed or it is executed in accordance with the
formalities for the execution of wills required in such jurisdiction., 60
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the statute created two alternative tests and satisfaction of either test
sustains the validity of the trust.161 It had previously been thought by
most Florida attorneys that a self-declaration of trust executed in Florida
must conform to the Florida Statute of Wills. Such trusts, said the court,
may be created by writing or parol, or partially in each, provided that the
words used are sufficient to create a trust, which make a trust "otherwise
157. Id.
158. 615 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1993).
159. Id. at 662.
160. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(I)(g) (1989).
161. Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 663.
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valid." Furthermore, the trust does not have to be executed with the
formalities for the execution of wills (i.e., witnesses, notary, etc.).'62
In another case interpreting a trust, NCNB National Bank of Florida v.
Shanaberger, 6 3 the Second District Court of Appeal questioned language
granting the trustee sole discretion to invade the principal for a beneficiary's
"care, maintenance, support, and medical attention." Before invading the
principal to satisfy a demand for nursing home and related medical expenses
for the trust beneficiary, the trustee had requested information about other
sources of income available to the beneficiary. The trust instrument
provided no criteria for making the necessary determination to invade the
principal other than for the trust purpose. The court stated that its only
function was to determine whether the trustee had abused its discretion by
its request for information of outside sources of income.'64 The court held
that there was no abuse of discretion and that even an unlimited invasion
power is subject to accountability to remaindermen for an improper, an
arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of discretion.'65
VI. GUARDIANSHIPS
Even though court statistics reveal an increase in guardianships and
Florida has a recognized growing senior population, few guardianship cases
end up in the appellate courts. Selection of an appropriate guardian is
obviously a matter of great concern and was addressed in Tagliabue v.
Fraser.166 The Tagliabue court held that appointment of a non-relative as
guardian of property was inappropriate where the incapacitated person was
the sole life beneficiary under a trust and the appointed guardian was sole
residuary beneficiary under the same trust. 167 According to the court,
Florida Statutes section 744.309(2) prohibits the appointment of a non-rela-
tive as guardian where a conflict of interest may occur.'68
The issue of attorney fees has also received the appellate courts'
attention. Namely, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
Whaley 69 involved, inter alia, fees to be paid to a guardian ad litem.
162. Id.
163. 616 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
164. Id. at 97-98.
165. Id. at 98.
166. 576 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
167. Id. at 401-02.
168. Id. at 402.
169. 574 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1991).
1993]
23
Donahue: Probate and Trust Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") was not
held responsible for fees of an attorney who was appointed by the trial court
as counsel for a guardian ad litem.'70 Therefore, the court observed that
HRS has no responsibility for or control over the guardian ad litem
program. This is a different statute than that required for appointment of an
attorney under guardianship laws in chapter 744 of the Florida Statutes, over
which the courts have jurisdiction to order payment of attorney fees from
a ward's assets.
Also concerning fees is In re Bockmuller,17' where the ward was
adjudicated incapacitated November 9, 1989, although she retained the rights
to vote and to marry. 172 After the ward was placed in a retirement home,
she told an attorney she wanted to go home and would hire someone to
assist her. The attorney filed an appearance and petitioned for restoration
of capacity and restoration of additional rights. The trial court found as a
matter of law there was no conflict, adverse interest, or any other basis for
removal of the guardians. However, the attorney continued to attempt to
remove the woman's guardians until her death on February 6, 1991. Later,
the attorney petitioned the trial court for attorney fees and costs, which were
to be paid from the ward's guardianship assets. Appeal was taken from the
trial court's order awarding attorney fees and costs. 173
The appellate court ruled that a ward's right to contract or hire an
attorney was removed by the order determining her incapacity.' 74 The
court stated that counsel for a ward must be contracted by one of the
guardians or appointed by the court. 75 Further, a ward has no power to
contract with an attorney to represent her in any proceeding.' 76  The
appellate court also found that the attorney's fees charged for time spent in
his continued efforts to remove the guardians served only to deplete the
ward's estate and served no benefit to the ward or her estate.' 77 The order
authorizing payment of attorney fees and costs was vacated and set
aside. 171
170. Id. at 101.
171. 602 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
172. Id. at 609.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. In re Bockmuller, 602 So. 2d at 609.
177. Id. at 610.
178. Id.
[Vol. 18
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/9
Donohue
The case of Metzger v. First National Bank of Clearwater'79 con-
cerned fees incurred by a party other than the guardian of the property. The
ward's husband unsuccessfully petitioned the court to partition jointly held
bank accounts for himself and the ward. The ward's daughter was guardian
of the person and a bank was guardian of the property. The guardian of the
person opposed the husband's petition for partition and defended the trial
court's order on appeal. The guardian of the person requested attorney fees,
asserting that her efforts benefitted the guardianship estate in the trial court
and appellate courts.
The appellate court ruled that attorney fees for services beneficial to the
ward may be awarded even though those services were not rendered by the
ward's guardian.' ° "[E]ven if [a person] is motivated by thoughts of
perhaps eventually inheriting what was left of the joint accounts if [ward
survived husband], the existence of such a motive is irrelevant to the
determination whether her efforts benefitted the guardianship estate."''
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Midland National Bank & Trust
v. Comerica Trust Co. 82 held that upon the death of an incapacitated
ward, unpaid administrative expenses and debts of a guardianship, as well
as debts of the ward which pre-existed creation of the guardianship but
which the court had ordered paid, are promptly payable from the ward's
guardianship estate prior to the guardian making distribution to the ward's
probate estate. 83  The court observed that the guardianship is a unique
entity that must, to the extent of its assets, satisfy or discharge all guardian-
ship administrative expenses, as well as obligations incurred by the guardian
for the ward, before the net assets remaining are distributable to the persons
entitled to them. 84
In re Brown"5 involved the court's jurisdiction over the guardian.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that there was no merit to
the guardian's contention that the lower court had no jurisdiction over her
in her capacity as the trustee of an inter vivos trust.'86 The court found
that the guardian had petitioned the court for appointment as guardian and,
179. 585 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
180. Id. at 373 (citing In re Dean, 319 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
181. Metzger, 585 So. 2d at 374.
182. 616 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
183. Id. at 1086.
184. Id.
185. 611 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
186. Id.
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in doing so, "clearly submitted herself individually to the court's jurisdic-
tion.""'
The guardian's power to act was the issue in Goeke v. Goeke."'8
Here, the court held that a guardian, with the approval of the court, has the
statutory power, pursuant to section 744.441 of the Florida Statutes, to
establish and modify IRA trusts or IRA custodial accounts for the ward.'89
This includes the authority to designate the ward's estate or family members
as beneficiaries for the IRA contract. The court noted that designation of
a beneficiary in an IRA agreement is not equivalent to writing or amending
a will for the ward. The guardian's exercise of this power must be
appropriate for, and in the best interest of, the ward.' 9°
VII. ELECTIVE SHARE
The elective share of a surviving spouse continues to plague the courts
in their attempt to follow the Florida Statutes.' 9' The manner of election
was the focus in Harmon v. Williams.92 In Harmon, the surviving
spouse's attorney had, within the elective share time limits, signed and filed
a "Notice of Intention to Petition for Elective Share" but no formal election
was ever filed. In holding the purported elective share election invalid, the
court stated that it was not signed either by the surviving spouse or by her
guardian, as required by the statute.' 93  The court conceded that an
attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney may be authorized to
make such election; however, that factual situation was not presented before
the court.'94 Furthermore, the election was held to be invalid because the
petition was merely a notice that a petition to determine the elective share
would be filed later, without stating any statutory grounds for the delay.'95
In In re Estate of Palmer,96 the court held that the "surviving spouse
is entitled to interest on [the] elective share from the date of the order
187. Id.
188. 613 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
189. Id. at 1347.
190. Id.
191. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-732.215 (1991).
192. 596 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
193. Id. at 1142.
194. Id. at 1143.
195. Id. at 1142.
196. 600 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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directing the personal representative to make payment."' 97 The personal
representative of the estate had withheld payment of the elective share
because of additional estate taxes from the decreased marital deduction
resulting from the election. In the previous related case of Tarbox v.
Palmer,9t the court had held that the election of the elective share by the
surviving spouse had not increased estate taxes but merely accelerated their
time for payment by the residuary beneficiaries of the QTIP trust for the
spouse; therefore, the surviving spouse was not to bear any additional
tax. 199
This elective share and burden of estate taxes issue has arisen again in
the controversy over the estate of Joe Robbie. In his estate plan, Joe Robbie
left assets in a QTIP trust for his wife. The assets included the Miami
Dolphin football team and part of Joe Robbie Stadium. Elizabeth Robbie,
Joe Robbie's surviving spouse, and mother of his eleven children, filed for
an elective share, which could result in accelerating approximately twenty-
five million dollars in estate taxes. If the entire QTIP trust principal had
been held at her death, the estate taxes would have been deferred until that
time. As of the writing of this article, the issue is unresolved. A literal
reading of section 732.215 of the Florida Statutes could, in some cases if
not this one, eliminate the spouse's entire elective share if the present
increase in estate taxes is charged against it. Also unresolved at this time
is whether a surviving spouse (in this case Elizabeth Robbie) who files for
an elective share would forfeit his or her right to benefits from the
remaining estate assets which pour over into a revocable trust created by the
deceased spouse which names the surviving spouse as an income and/or
principal beneficiary. Florida law may be clarified if the Robbie case is
resolved by a court rather than settled out of court. In any event, it should
prompt more attorneys to provide appropriate language in revocable trusts
as to the effect of a spouse filing an elective share.2 ° °
197. Id, at 538 (citing Price v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 419 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)).
198. 564 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
199. Id. at 1108.
200. For a discussion of the Robbie litigation, see Barry A. Nelson, Litigation in the Joe
Robbie Estate Illustrates Elective Share/Revocable Trust Traps, 66 FLA. B.J. 38 (Jan. 1993).
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VIII. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Creditors' Claims Post-Pope
In the last two years, the Florida Legislature has responded to state and
national case law and consumer concerns by adopting specific legislation.
Chapters 731 through 733 are considered the "Florida Probate Code" and
chapter 737 includes the limited Florida statutes on trusts.
A significant case decided by the United States Supreme Court, Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope2°' dealt with the proper
notice required for creditors of a probate estate under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In that
case, the widow of a decedent was appointed by an Oklahoma probate court
to be the executrix of her husband's estate. Under Oklahoma law, with
which she complied, she was required to publish notice in a local legal
newspaper and to give creditors of her husband's estate up to sixty days
within which to file claims against the estate. The collection company had
been assigned the claim for decedent's hospital expenses from the hospital
in which Mr. Pope died. The company claimed that they should have
received actual notice of the claim period since, certainly under the
circumstances of this case, the hospital was a known or ascertainable
creditor. The Supreme Court left it to the various states to make specific
provisions for creditors' claims periods and the procedures to be followed.
As a result, Florida modified section 733.212 of the Florida Statutes.
In Florida, the personal representative of the estate is now obliged to
send notice to known and ascertainable creditors of the decedent, 2 ' An
affidavit of the mailing must be signed and filed with the court by the
personal representative, who must make a diligent search for creditors.0 3
The search usually includes a review of the preceding two or three years of
check registers, tax returns, and finally, the mail arriving after the death.
B. House Bill 1295
A composite bill changing several unrelated provisions of trust and
probate statutory law was passed by the 1993 Florida Legislature and, by a
201. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
202. See FLA. STAT. § 733.212(4)(a) (1991).
203. Id.
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whisker, became law absent the Governor's signature. House Bill 1295
covered four topics: creditors' rights and revocable living trusts; fees for
attorneys and personal representatives in the event of disputes; changes in
the prudent investor rule; and the application of certain rules of construction
found in the Probate Code to-trust agreements.2 °4
One of the efforts of the bill was to make trust administration more
similar to probate administration. There has not been a reported case on the
specific obligation of a trustee holding assets of a decedent to notify the
decedent's creditors of the existence of the trust nor any case requiring
payment from trust corpus to a decedent's creditors. This is in contrast to
specific probate statutes and case law.20 5 While a trustee taking over as
trustee from a grantor/decedent has always had the obligation to notify
beneficiaries of a change of trustee,0 6 this author believes that only
professional trustees commonly carry out this notice requirement. Under the
most recent law passed, a trustee has an obligation to publish a notice to
creditors in a local newspaper for two consecutive weeks and consequently
delay distributing trust assets until the three month creditor period has
elapsed.2 7
In addition to the notice for claimants, a trustee is obliged to pay any
administrative expenses and timely filed enforceable creditors' claims from
trust funds upon certification by the personal representative that there are
insufficient funds in the probate estate with which to pay them.208 The
new statute does not address the fairly common situation as to who certifies
if there is no certification. It also does not provide a procedure for creditors
whose claims are denied by a trustee where there is no probate estate.
There is no mention of taxes, either because of an oversight on the part of
the authors or because the Internal Revenue Code already provides that the
tax obligation follows the assets. The various circuit courts and clerks will
need to establish procedures and filing fees for this additional function,
although the clerks may have to steel themselves for the abundance of
individual trustees who will be attempting to do this on their own without
an attorney. This statutory change diminishes the difference between the
revocable living trust and the probate process for many individuals in
Florida, making such trusts less attractive.
204. Ch. 93-257, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 103-31.
206. FLA. STAT. § 737.303 (1991).
207. Ch. 93-257, § 15, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2510 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 737.305701)(a)(c)).
208. Id. § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2509 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056(1)).
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Another change contained in this composite bill addresses the old
"prudent investor" rule enunciated many years ago by Justice Putnam in
Harvard College v. Amory.2"9 As modem portfolio theory evolved, more
investment options became available, and this new world had trouble fitting
in with the quaint language. The new law amends sections 518.11, 660.43 1,
733.212, 733.607, 733.617, 733.707, and 737.302 and creates section
518.112 of the Florida Statutes.2" °
There are two main parts to the changes adopted in the prudent investor
rule. The first is that the fiduciary (trustee, personal representative,
guardian) is obliged to consider not just the individual investments in a
vacuum, but rather the entire portfolio taken as a whole. The fiduciary must
consider the needs of the beneficiaries, wards, and the goal of the trust
agreement. Diversification is specifically encouraged.21'
The second major change applicable to investment duties of fiduciaries
is that for the first time under Florida statutory law, the investment function
can be delegated. If a fiduciary wishes to assign both the duty and the
responsibility of investments in a particular fiduciary account to anyone else,
including an investment manager or a bank, the trustee can do so without
fully resigning as trustee. There is a specific procedure to be followed of
notifying the beneficiaries of any trust or seeking court approval in the case
of a guardianship and then delegating. Many current trust agreements allow
for the hiring of investment advisors by the trustee, but the trustee is
expected to retain full power and responsibility in such a situation.2" 2
Chapter 737 is the part of the Florida Statutes that addresses trusts in
Florida. There is very little statutory law contained therein. Some rules of
construction which have been found in the Florida Probate Code will now
be found in the chapter on trusts.213 For example, a willful slayer, that is
one who kills the grantor or another person upon whose death such
beneficiary's interest depends, cannot recover anything as a beneficiary of
a trust. The language is not identical to the language in the existing probate
statute on killers not being entitled to revenue from an estate. 2 4 Appar-
209. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Aloisi, 481 N.E.2d 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(citing Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446, 461 (Mass. 1830)).
210. Ch. 93-257, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500.
211. Id. § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2501 (amending FLA. STAT. § 518.11 (1991), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(a)(c)).
212. Id.
213. Id. §§ 15-16, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2510-12 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§
733.3057, 737.621).
214. See FLA. STAT § 732.802 (1991).
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ently, if you intend to kill someone and expect to be convicted of intentional
murder, make sure your victim has a revocable trust. Another section
adopted in the trust law is the assumption that any distribution is on a "per
stirpes" basis.2"' It would have been more useful if the "antilapse"
statute.16 had been adopted as part of the 1993 amendments to chapter
737.
IX. JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The question of how joint bank accounts are held has been the subject
of several cases and a new statute passed by the 1992 Florida Legislature.
Prior to July 3, 1992, the ownership of joint bank accounts depended on the
type of financial institution in which the account was opened. For savings
banks and savings and loan associations, there was a conclusive presumption
that, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, a savings account held in
the names of two or more people constituted a joint tenancy with rights of
survivorship. However, for commercial banks and credit unions, in the
absence of fraud or undue influence, there was a rebuttable presumption of
survivorship rights by proving contrary intent by "clear and convincing
evidence." Many cases introduced clear and convincing evidence of such
contrary intent: (1) the form and the language on the account card itself and
signature cards; (2) the age and physical condition of an owner; (3) the
relationship of the parties; (4) the use of the account; (5) the knowledge of
the surviving tenants; (6) the source of the deposits; (7) the control of any
passbook; and (8) the relationship of the account to the owner's estate plan.
If the action involving ownership was brought by a co-tenant rather than a
survivor, the statutory presumptions did not apply.
In a leading case, In re Estate of Combee,2" 7 the Second District
Court of Appeal applied the statutory presumption to joint commercial bank
accounts opened by the decedent with two other persons as signatories. The
contractual language on the bank's signature contract card clearly expressed
a right of survivorship. The trial court had allowed parol evidence but
excluded the testimony of the surviving tenants as self-serving. In the
absence of clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent to rebut the
215. Ch. 93-257, § 16, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2511 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.624).
216. FLA. STAT. § 732.603 (1991).
217. 58.3 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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statutory presumption, the bank accounts were held to be survivorship
accounts and the surviving co-tenants became the account owners."'
The distinction between financial institutions holding joint bank
accounts was abolished by chapter 655 of the Florida Statutes in July,
1992.219 "Unless otherwise expressly provided in a contract, . . . signature
card, . . . [or the like], a deposit account in the names of two or more
persons shall be presumed to have been intended by such persons to provide
that, upon death of any one of them, all rights ... vest in the survivor.,
221
The rebuttable presumption may be overcome by proof of fraud or undue
influence or by clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent. 221 True
convenience accounts are excepted from this rule, and Totten trust accounts
are still recognized. As a practical matter, a customer must aggressively
demand a convenience account if that is desired.
Between husband and wife, jointly held real property is presumed to be
held as tenancy by the entireties, but the presumption does not apply to
personal property owned by a husband and wife together. "[T]he intention
of the parties must be proven unless the instrument creating the tenancy
clearly bears an express designation that the tenancy is one held by the
entireties. 222 The distinction is important since creditors wishing to attach
the joint bank accounts of a husband and wife to satisfy the debt of one
spouse may reach the account if held as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship but not if held as tenants by the entireties. 23  The Florida
courts have been concerned with ascertaining the spouses' intent in
establishing and using ajoint bank account. Bank signature cards have been
examined, although they typically refer to such accounts as joint with right
of survivorship and do not mention a tenancy by the entirety. Also, whether
the joint bank account was created from jointly owned funds and whether
it was used for the spouses' joint expenses were other considerations in the
courts' attempts to ascertain the spouses' intentions.
In Terrace Bank of Florida v. Brady,224 the court seemed to shift its
focus from the intent of the depositor-spouses to an examination of the
218. Id. at 712-13.
219. FLA. STAT. §§ 655.001-655.954 (Supp. 1992).
220. Id. § 655.79(1) (emphasis added).
221. Id. § 655.79(2).
222. First Nat'l Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla.
1971).
223. See Terrace Bank of Florida v. Brady, 598 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
224. 598 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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bank's policies and regulations as to joint bank accounts being held as
tenants by the entireties, including whether the bank offered such accounts
and whether they were specifically requested by the spouses upon cre-
ation.225 The court also stated that the burden of proof required of a
married couple attempting to shield their bank account from the claims of
a spouse's creditor meet the "clear and convincing" standard of evi-
dence. 6 The Florida Statutes now impose the same standard to all joint
bank accounts. Consequently, husbands and wives desiring protection from
individual liability should take appropriate action to clearly and convincingly
designate and treat their joint bank accounts as "tenancy by the entirety"
accounts.
X. CONCLUSION
Probate and trust law in Florida continues to evolve. The Florida
Legislature has attempted to codify many aspects, particularly in the trust
law area. However, it is certain that the most recent statute will be amended
in the next legislative session and we will see additional codification in this
area. Also certain will be the continued plethora of cases as the parties and
courts attempt to deal with these new statutes as well as aspects not covered
by them. It is such activity that makes the attorney's practice in probate and
trust law interesting and (hopefully) rewarding.
225. Id. at 228.
226. Id
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